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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Does protection against marital status discrimination under 
the Fair Employment and Housing Act exclude unmarried 
cohabiting couples if their inclusion contradicts legislative 
intent and the state's public policy in favor of formal 
marriage?
2. Should an individual be exempt from the Fair Employment and 
Housing Act when the government lacks a compelling interest 
justifying the infringement upon her constitutional right to 
free exercise of religion?
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KENNETH C. PHILLIPS AND )
GAIL RANDALL, )
)
Real Parties in Interest. )
_______________________________________________ )
PETITIONER'S BRIEF ON THE MERITS
Review of the Judgment of the Court of Appeal,
Third Appellate District
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Preliminary Statement
Kenneth Phillips and Gail Randall filed a written complaint 
with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (Department) on 
April 17, 1987 and January 27, 1988, respectively. (C.T. 3.)
They alleged that Petitioner, Evelyn Smith, violated the Fair 
Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and the Unruh Civil Rights Act 
{Unruh Act) by denying them rental of her apartment based upon 
their marital status. Id. Based upon these complaints, the 
Department issued two accusations against Mrs. Smith on February
1
22, 1988. (C.T. 3.) The accusations charged her with violating
the FEHA and the Unruh Act. Id.
On August 10, 1989, the Fair Employment and Housing 
Commission (Commission) found Mrs. Smith in violation of 
Government Code sections 12955 and 12943, provisions of the FEHA 
(C.T. 10.) The Commission also found her in violation of Civil 
Code section 51, a provision of the Unruh Act. (C.T. 11.)
However, the Commission did not rule on Mrs. Smith's 
constitutional claim of religious exemption from the FEHA. (C.T. 
11.)
In response to the :ommission's finding, Mrs. Smith 
petitioned for an alternative writ of mandate in the Butte County 
Superior Court on September 8, 1989. (C.T. 19-24.) The parties
later stipulated to a dismissal of this petition and proceeded by 
original petition directly to the court of appeal. (C.T. 28.) a 
petition for an alternative writ was filed with the Third District 
of the California Court of Appeal on November 2, 1989. (C.T. 31-
36.) On May 26, 1994, the appellate court issued an alternative 
writ of mandate. (C.T. 38.) This Court granted review on 
September 8, 1994. (C.T. 64.)
Statement of Facts
Petitioner, Evelyn Smith, owns and leases four rental units 
in Chico, California. (C.T. 3.) Mrs. Smith is a Christian who 
has been a member of Bidwell Presbyterian Church in Chico for 
approximately twenty-five years. (C.T. 4.) She firmly believes 
that sex outside of marriage is sinful and that it is a sin for 
her to rent to people who will engage in non-marital sex on her
2
property. (C.T. 4.) She believes that God will judge her for 
committing this sin, and she will thus be prevented from meeting 
her deceased husband in the hereafter. Id.
While Mrs. Smith prefers not to rent to unmarried couples, 
she has rented to individuals who are married, single, divorced, 
or widowed. (C.T. 4.) When prospective tenants inquire about a 
vacant unit, Mrs. Smith tells them of her preference for married 
couples. (C.T. 3.) Although she has deep religious convictions, 
Mrs. Smith never inquires into the religious background of her 
tenants. (C.T. 4.)
On April 2, 1987, Phillips and Randall telephoned Mrs. Smith 
to inquire about renting one of her available apartments. (C.T. 
4.) During this conversation, Mrs. Smith stated that she 
preferred to rent to married couples. Id. Phillips and Randall 
were not married. Id. Despite Mrs. Smith's express preference, 
Phillips and Randall arranged to tour her property. Id.
Later that day, Phillips and Randall met with Mrs. Smith and 
were shown the premises. (C.T. 4.) At this time, Mrs. Smith told 
them that she would not rent to unmarried couples. Id^ Phillips 
and Randall then falsely represented to Mrs. Smith that they were 
married. Id. Randall even misrepresented her name by signing 
"Gail Phillips," on the rental application. Id.
Phillips and Randall decided to rent the apartment, so they 
met with Mrs. Smith to sign the lease and to pay a $150 security 
deposit. (C.T. 4-5.) During this meeting, Mrs. Smith again told 
them that she preferred not to rent to unmarried couples. Id. 
However, the couple still did not reveal to Mrs. Smith that they
3
were not married. Id. Randall again signed her name as "Gail 
Phillips," this time to the lease agreement. (C.T. 5.) Later 
that day, Phillips called Mrs. Smith and told her that he and 
Randall were in fact not married. Id. Mrs. Smith then informed 
him that she could not rent to an unmarried couple because it 
would violate her religious beliefs, and returned their security 
deposit. Id.
After they were denied rental by Mrs. Smith, Phillips and 
Randall filed complaints with the Department. (C.T. 3.)
Thereafter, the Commission ruled that Mrs. Smith had violated the 
FEHA and the Unruh Act. (C.T. 8-10.) The Commission ordered her 
to pay monetary damages to Phillips and Randall, to post notices 
in her rental units announcing her violation of the FEHA, to 
"cease and desist" from discriminating on the basis of marital 
status. (C.T. 13-14.) In addition, the Commission ordered her to 
permanently post and distribute to prospective tenants, another 
notice stating that it is illegal for property owners to 
discriminate on the basis of marital status, which includes 
unmarried cohabiting couples. (C.T. 13.)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The appellate court properly issued the writ of mandate 
compelling the Fair Employment and Housing Commission (Commission) 
to set aside its decision holding Mrs. Smith in violation of the 
Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) . Mrs. Smith did not 
violate the FEHA because the prohibition of discrimination based 
upon marital status does not apply to unmarried cohabiting couples 
such as Randall and Phillips. Legislative history indicates that 
the California legislature did not intend to include unmarried 
cohabiting couples when it added "marital status" to the list of 
classes to be protected under the FEHA. In order to remain 
consistent with public policy promoting marriage, "marital status" 
should not be broadened to include unmarried cohabiting couples. 
Furthermore, Mrs. Smith did not discriminate against Randall and 
Phillips based upon their marital status, but rather, objected to 
their non-marital sexual activity.
Alternatively, if the FEHA’s "marital status" protection does 
apply, Mrs. Smith's constitutional right to free exercise of 
religion warrants her exemption from the FEHA. The Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) , the California Constitution, and 
the United States Supreme Court decision in Employment Division vi. 
csmith all mandate application of the compelling interest test in 
this case. Application of this four-part test dictates that Mrs. 
Smith should be granted an exemption. First, Mrs. Smith's 
religious beliefs are sincere. Also, the Commission's order 
substantially burdens her freedom to exercise her religious 
beliefs because it prevents her from complying with the precepts
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of her religion and forces her to act affirmatively against her 
religious beliefs. Furthermore, the state interest in protecting 
unmarried cohabiting couples from housing discrimination is not a 
compelling interest justifying infringement of free exercise 
rights. Mrs. Smith’s refusal to rent to unmarried cohabiting 
couples does not threaten the peace and safety of the state, nor 
does it hinder the progress of an important state objective. 
Finally, enforcing the FEHA against Mrs. Smith is not the least 
restrictive means of achieving the state's goal of preventing 
housing discrimination.
ARGUMENT
I. THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE COURT OF APPEAL ' S WRIT OF
MANDATE DISMISSING CHARGES AGAINST MRS. SMITH FOR VIOLATING
THE FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING ACT BECAUSE MRS. SMITH DID
NOT DISCRIMINATE AGAINST PHILLIPS AND RANDALL BASED UPON
THEIR MARITAL STATUS.
Since the facts in this case are undisputed, and only pure 
questions of law are before this Court, the proper standard of 
review is de novo. McMillin v. Countv of San Dieao. 31 Cal. App. 
4th 545, 553 (1995).
The Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) does not protect 
unmarried cohabiting couples under "marital status." The FEHA 
states, in relevant part, that it is unlawful for the owner of any 
housing accommodation to discriminate on the basis of "race, 
color, religion, sex, marital status, national origin, ancestry, 
familial status, or disability." Cal. Gov't Code § 12955(a) (West 
1994). However, neither the FEHA nor this Court have expressly 
defined "marital status." However, other courts have addressed 
the issue.
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Courts that have defined marital status are not in agreement.
Maryland, Minnesota and Wisconsin courts, consistent with public 
policy favoring marriage, have held that unmarried cohabiting 
couples are not included under marital status. Prince George's 
County V. Greenbelt Homes. Inc.. 431 A.2d 745, 747 (Md. Ct. App. 
1981); Cooper v. French. 460 N.W.2d 2, 11 (Minn. 1990); Countv of 
nanp V. Norman. 497 N.W.2d 714, 717 (Wis. 1993). On the other 
hand, the California Court of Appeal and Massachusetts and Alaska 
courts have broadened the definition of marital status, holding 
that it does include unmarried cohabiting couples. Atkisson v^ 
Kern Countv Hous. Auth. . 59 Cal. App. 3d 89, 96 (1976); Worchester 
Hous. Auth. V. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 547 
N.E.2d 43, 45 (Mass. 1989); Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights 
Comm'n. 874 P.2d 274, 276 (Alaska 1994), cert, denied, 115 S. Ct. 
460 (1994). The differing definitions among various state courts 
demonstrate that "marital status" does not have a plain meaning.
The lack of uniformity among statutes and regulations that 
expressly define marital status also illustrates that the term is 
subject to varying interpretations. The California Code of 
Regulations addressing marital status discrimination in employment 
defines marital status as an individual's state of marriage, non­
marriage, divorce or dissolution, separation, widowhood, and 
annulment. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 7292,1 (1990). In contrast, 
a Minnesota human rights statute includes people who are remarried 
or who are surviving spouses, but excludes people who have 
annulments. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 363.01 (West 1994).
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Because "marital status" is ambiguous, this Court must look
to "all pertinent" factors to decipher its meaning. In re 
Marriage of Bouquet. 16 Cal. 3d 583, 587 (1976). As legislative 
history and public policy demonstrate, the correct definition of 
marital status is a narrow one, excluding unmarried cohabiting 
couples.
A. Legislative history of the Fair Employment and Housing
Act demonstrates that the legislature did not intend to
include unmarried cohabiting couples under "marital
status."
A pertinent factor to consider in determining the legislative 
intent of the FEHA is a letter written by Senator Nicholas Petris, 
sponsor of the bill which added "marital status" to the list of 
classes to be protected. As Chairman of the Senate Select 
Committee on Housing and Urban Affairs, Senator Petris wrote to 
the Governor of California, urging him to sign the bill. (C.T.
50.) In his letter, Senator Petris specifically addressed the 
need to protect single men and women who were stereotyped by 
landlords as being irresponsible and less stable than nuclear 
families. Id. He also expressed the need to protect female 
divorcees and widows with children from discrimination. Id.
Senator Petris specifically named these groups, highlighting the 
legislature’s intent to ensure their inclusion under "marital 
status." Had he seen a need to protect unmarried cohabiting 
couples, he would have also mentioned them.
Although the Petris letter by itself is not determinative, 
when coupled with expressed judicial preference for marriage, it 
is clear that the legislature did not intend to include unmarried
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couples. In Boucaiet. this Court was asked to interpret whether 
the legislature intended an ambiguous statute to have retroactive 
effect. Bouquet. 16 Cal. 3d at 587. This Court asserted that in 
interpreting a statute, a court may assiame that the legislature 
was aware of judicial decisions. Id. at 588. In Bouquet. this 
Court assumed that the legislature knew of the dubious 
constitutional nature of the old law and inferred that in 
replacing the law, the legislature intended it to have retroactive 
effect. Id. Although Mrs. Smith's case differs in that the 
legislature did not replace a previous law by adding "marital 
status" to the FEHA, the rationale regarding assumption of 
legislative awareness of judicial decisions is applicable. It is 
reasonable for this Court to assume that when the legislature 
added "marital status" to the enumerated classes protected under 
the FEHA, the legislature was fully aware of judicial views on 
marriage. Prior to and during 1975, this Court and the California 
Court of Appeal consistently asserted the state interest in 
promoting and preserving marriage. See In re Lisa R. . 13 Cal. 3d 
636, 650 (1975), cert, denied. 421 U.S. 1014 (1975); In re 
Marriaae of McKim. 6 Cal. 3d 673, 680 (1972) (stating that "the 
public is interested in the marriage relationship and the 
maintenance of its integrity"); People v, Cameron. 53 Cal. App. 3d 
786, 791 (1975) (stating that "the voluminous laws . . . 
demonstrate the vital interest of the state in marriage"); In re 
Estate of Ginochio, 43 Cal. App. 3d 412, 418 (1972) (stating that 
"the state indisputably has a paramount interest in encouraging 
the institution of marriage"). In light of pronounced judicial
9
interest in promoting marriage, if the legislature indeed intended 
to subvert this interest and protect unmarried cohabiting couples, 
it would have made the statutory language more clear. The 
legislature did not make the intent to include unmarried 
cohabiting couples clear because it had no such intent.
B. Public policy dictates a narrow interpretation of
.Marital status" which excludes unmarried cohabiting
couples.
In order to remain consistent with public policy favoring 
marriage, "marital status” should be interpreted narrowly, to 
exclude unmarried cohabiting couples. In 1988, this Court 
reaffirmed "the state's substantial interest in promoting and 
protecting marriage." Elden v. Sheldon, 46 Cal. 3d 267, 275 
(1988). This interest is not based upon old-fashioned notions of 
morality, but rather, it serves a practical purpose. Id.
Marriage is the only union recognized by the government because it 
provides an "institutional basis for defining the fundamental 
rights and responsibilities of persons." Id. (quoting Laws v. 
Griep. 332 N.W.2d 339, 341 (Iowa 1983)). Married couples receive 
certain rights not afforded to unmarried couples. For instance, 
in Elden v. Sheldon, this Court denied damages for emotional 
distress and loss of consortium to the surviving member of an 
unmarried cohabiting couple. Id. Furthermore, unmarried people 
do not have a cause of action for wrongful death on behalf of 
cohabiting partners. See Garcia v. Douglas Aircraft Co.. 133 Cal. 
App. 3d 890, 893 (1982) . The legally recognized institution of 
marriage draws a clear line between those who receive these 
benefits and those who do not.
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In an effort to remain consistent with Wisconsin's interest
in promoting marriage, the Wisconsin Supreme Court invalidated a 
county ordinance prohibiting discrimination against cohabiting 
couples. County of Dane v. Norman. 497 N.W.2d at 717. The Norman 
court held that forcing landlords to rent to "cohabitants" was 
inconsistent with Wisconsin's public policy promoting marriage.
Id. at 716. If this Court broadens marital status to include 
unmarried cohabiting couples, the Court would essentially be 
elevating unmarried couples to the same level of protection as 
married couples. This would undermine the Court's expressed goal 
of promoting formal marriage.
Including unmarried cohabiting couples under the definition 
of marital status grants them recognition as a union and 
contradicts this state’s nonrecognition of common law marriages. 
California abolished common law marriages in 1895 to assert its 
policy in favor of formal marriage. See Elden v. Sheldon, 46 Cal. 
3d at 275. "Cohabit" is defined as living "together as if husband 
or wife." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (9th ed.
1985). Similarly, this Court has defined common law marriages as 
a man and woman cohabiting and representing themselves as husband 
and wife. Kusior v. Silver. 54 Cal. 2d 603, 612 (1960). By 
seeking recognition as a union defined by their cohabitation, 
Phillips and Randall are essentially asking this Court to 
recognize a union similar to a common law marriage. When faced 
with this same issue, the Maryland Court of Appeal wisely denied 
recognition of an unmarried cohabiting couple to remain consistent 
with the state’s nonrecognition of common law marriage. Prince
11
n^oroe's County. 431 A.2d at 748. The Maryland court, in
referring to an unmarried couple, held that "while each separately 
had a marital status, collectively they did not," reaffirming that 
in states that do not recognize common law marriages, legal 
marriage is the only means for two people to gain recognition as a 
collective unit. Id. In order to remain consistent with 
California's expressed interest in promoting legal marriage and 
its nonrecognition of common law marriage, marital status should 
not include unmarried cohabiting couples.
C. The California Court of Appeal's definition of marital
status is unpersuasive.
Although California appellate courts have found that 
unmarried cohabiting couples are included under "marital status," 
their decisions are unpersuasive. Hess v. Fair Employment & 
Housing Comm’n. 138 Cal. App. 3d 232, 235 (1982); Atkisson, 59 
Cal. App. 3d at 96. Both cases are distinguishable from Mrs. 
Smith's. In Atkisson. the appellate court was confronted with the 
issue of whether the Housing Authority's policy forbidding tenants 
from living with anyone of the opposite sex not related by blood, 
marriage, or adoption, violated the Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) regulations against automatic denial of occupancy to a 
particular class. Atkisson, 59 Cal. App. 3d at 92. First, unlike 
the Housing Authority, which is obligated to rent to low income 
tenants throughout the state, Mrs. Smith is a landlord of four 
small rental units. Also, the complainants in Atkisson did not 
allege marital status discrimination, nor was it expressly 
disallowed by the HUD. Atkisson. 59 Cal. App. 3d at 94. Thus,
12
the issue before the appellate court was not an interpretation of 
"marital status." Yet the appellate court took the liberty of 
inserting this language for the complainants. Atkisson. 59 Cal. 
App. 3d at 96. The court then concluded that marital status 
discrimination included discrimination against unmarried 
cohabiting couples, yet provided no further explanation. Id.
Another California appellate court reaffirmed the Atkisson 
inclusion of unmarried cohabiting couples under marital status, 
figss, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 234. Yet this case is also 
distinguishable from Mrs. Smith’s. In Hess. the landlord refused 
to recognize the aggregate income of an unmarried couple. Id. at 
23 5. Mrs. Smith differs from the landlord in Hess because her 
reasons for refusing to recognize Phillips and Randall as a 
collective union were not for financial, but religious reasons.
The He.sg court held that this constituted marital status 
discrimination. Id. Yet again, the court provided no reasoning. 
Absent any logical or intelligent argument explaining why 
unmarried cohabiting couples are a class under marital status, the 
conclusions in Atkisson and Hess are not only not binding upon 
this Court, but are also unpersuasive. There is no reason to 
blindly adopt conclusions lacking rationale, especially when they 
are inconsistent with both the legislative intent of the FEHA and 
public policy set forth by this Court.
D. Mrs. Smith objected to Phillips' and Randall’s conduct,
not to their marital status.
Mrs. Smith's motivation for denying rental to Phillips and 
Randall was based upon their conduct, not their status. In
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deciding a case similar to Mrs. Smith's, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court distinguished between "conduct" and "status." Norman, 497 
N.W.2d at 717. The Wisconsin court defined marital status as "the 
state or condition of being married, . . . single, and the like." 
Id. at 715. Conduct, on the other hand, is defined as "personal 
behavior," "mode of action," or "any positive or negative act."
Id. at 717 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990)). Thus, 
the Norman court held that a landlord who preferred not to rent 
his property to unrelated individuals seeking to live together did 
not discriminate based upon marital status. Id. at 715. He 
opposed their conduct, not their individual marital status. Id. 
at 718.
The Norman court's distinction between conduct and status is 
applicable to Mrs. Smith's situation. Mrs. Smith did not 
discriminate against Phillips and Randall because of their status. 
She objected to their personal behavior and their non-marital 
sexual activity. Hers is a preference against conduct, not 
status. In fact, the Fair Employment and Housing Commission found 
that Mrs. Smith "would not rent to anyone who engages in sex 
outside of the marriage, whether they are single, divorced, 
widowed or married." (C.T. 4.) Because Mrs. Smith refused to 
rent to Phillips and Randall because of their conduct, and not 
their individual marital status, she did not violate the FEHA.
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II. THE COMPELLING INTEREST TEST IS THE PROPER TEST TO APPLY IN
DETERMINING WHETHER MRS. SMITH'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION WARRANTS EXEMPTION FROM THE FAIR
EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING ACT.
Three sources of law dictate that this Court should apply the 
compelling interest test to determine whether requiring Mrs. Smith 
to rent to unmarried cohabiting couples would violate her right to 
free exercise of religion. These laws include; 1) the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) which enforces the First Amendment 
to the United States Constitution; 2) Article I, section 4 of the 
California Constitution; and 3) the United States Supreme Court 
decision in Employment Division v. Smith. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
Regardless of which source of law this Court chooses to apply, the 
result is the same. To decide whether Mrs. Smith should be 
exempted from the FEHA' s infringement upon her right to freely 
exercise her religion, the compelling interest test is the proper 
test to apply.
A. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act explicitly
recaiires application of the compelling interest test.
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution states, in relevant part, "Congress shall make 
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof . , . U.S. Const, amend. I. The
Fourteenth Amendment makes this applicable to states.^ In 1963, 
the United States Supreme Court exempted an individual from a 
valid law because the law infringed upon her right to free
^ Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment states, in relevant part, that "(n]o 
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States." U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1.
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exercise of religion. Sherberf. v■ Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 
(1962) .
In Sherbert. the Court set forth the test for analyzing a 
Free Exercise Clause exemption from a statutory obligation.
First, the claimant’s belief must be religiously-based and 
sincerely held. Sherbert. 374 U.S. at 402-03. Next, the state’s 
regulation must impose a burden upon the claimant. Sherbert, 374 
U.S. at 403-04. After the claimant successfully proves these 
elements, the state must defend the enforcement of the regulation 
by proving that the state has a compelling interest in imposing 
the regulation. Id. at 407. If the claimant successfully proves 
his or her sincerely held religious belief and burden upon 
religious practice, and the government fails to prove a compelling 
interest in the law, the claimant must be exempted from the law. 
Writing for the majority. Justice Brennan specifically rejected 
the rational basis test in the free exercise context, asserting 
that "no showing merely of a rational relationship to some 
colorable state interest would suffice." Id. at 406. Only the 
"gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" warrant 
infringement upon the right to free exercise of religion. Id_. In 
1972, the Supreme Court applied the Sherbert compelling interest 
test in Wisconsin v. Yoder. 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and again granted 
a constitutional exemption, this time from compulsory state 
education laws. Since Sherbert and Yoder, the Supreme Court has 
granted constitutional exemptions numerous times, each time, 
applying the compelling interest test. See Frazee v. Illinois 
Dep't of Employment Sec.. 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v^
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Unemployment Appeals Comm’n. 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review 
Bd.. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
However, in 1989, the Supreme Court held that prohibiting the 
free exercise of religion is permissible if it is not the object, 
but merely the "incidental effect" of a law of general 
applicability. Employment Division v. Smith. 494 U.S. 872, 878 
(1989) . This decision was highly criticized by members of the 
media. Congress, scholars, and religious interest groups. Maureen 
E. Markey, The Price of Landlord's "Free" Exercise of Religion: 
Tenant's Right to Discrimination-Free Housing and Privacy, 22
Fordham Urb. L.J. 699, 727, n.l38 (1995) [hereinafter Markey, 
Landlord's "Free Exercise"!. Several scholars have described the 
decision as a "sweeping disaster for religious liberty." James E. 
Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An 
Iconoclastic Assessment. 78 Va. L. Rev. 1407, 1409, n.79 (1992). 
The Court essentially held that laws which indirectly, although 
substantially, affect religious practice, would be held to a low 
level of scrutiny. This decision undermined one of this country's 
most fundamental freedoms, namely the freedom to practice one's 
chosen religion.
Pursuant to the power granted by section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA) . U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 5 (granting Congress the power 
to enforce provisions contained in the amendments by appropriate 
legislation). Congress enacted RFRA in reaction to Smith, 
rejecting application of the incidental effects test. RFRA 
expressly reinstated the compelling interest test, stating.
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”[g3overnment shall not substantially burden a person's exercise 
of religion" unless the burden is in "furtherance of a compelling 
governmental interest" and "is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that compelling governmental burden." 42 U.S.C.S. § 
2000bb-l (Law. Co-op. 1995). Reinstatement of this standard is 
consistent with decades of judicial application of strict scrutiny 
to any law which burdens the constitutional right to free exercise 
of religion.
B. The California Constitution provides greater protection
than the U.S. Constitution, thus mandating application
of the compelling interest test.
As guarantor of the rights set forth in the California 
Constitution, this Court is not bound to the mode of analysis 
provided by the federal government. City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's 
Castle. Inc.. 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982). Instead, this Court is 
free to implement a different analysis in order to grant 
protection consistent with the goals of the constitution of this 
state. Id. Article I, section 4 of the California Constitution 
specifically "guarantees the free exercise and enjoyment of 
religion." Cal. Const, art. I, § 4. This guarantee indicates 
greater protection of religious liberty than its federal 
counterpart, which only prohibits laws that hinder free exercise. 
See U.S. Const, amend. I. A state has the sovereign right to 
adopt, in its own constitution, individual liberties more 
expansive than the ones conferred by the U.S. Constitution. 
Prunevard Shopping Ctr. v.. Robins. 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).
In weighing statutory infringement against free exercise 
rights, this Court has consistently applied the compelling
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interest test to determine whether a religious practice warrants 
exemption from a statute. In People v. Woodv. 61 Cal. 2d 716 
(1964), this Court has weighed free exercise of religion against 
the state's interest in prohibiting possession of peyote. In 
applying the compelling interest test, this Court decided to 
exempt Navajo Indians from the ban on peyote, which they used for 
religious purposes, noting that "the right to religious freedom 
embodies a precious heritage of [this country's] history." Woodv, 
61 Cal. 2d at 727.
More recently, this Court applied the compelling interest 
test to decide whether the California Constitution allows 
individuals to bring claims against a religious organization for 
alleged fraudulent conduct. Molko v_. Holv Spirit Ass'n. 46 Cal.
3d 1092, 1100 (1988). This Court has consistently applied the 
compelling interest test in determining the burden required of the 
government to justify infringing upon the right to free exercise. 
This Court should continue to do so, regardless of other analysis 
used by the Federal courts.
C. Employment Division v. Smith dictates application of the
compelling interest test because the facts of this case
present a "hybrid" situation.
While the Supreme Court declined to apply the compelling 
interest test in Smith, it conceded that in cases involving hybrid 
situations, the measure of constitutionality remains the 
compelling state interest test. Smith. 494 U.S. at 884-85.
Hybrid situations occur where the government infringes upon more 
than one constitutional right. Id. Mrs. Smith’s case warrants 
application of the compelling interest test because the government
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infringed upon two of her constitutional rights: freedom to 
exercise religion and freedom of speech.
The facts before this Court present a hybrid situation; 
therefore, even \mder Smith, the compelling interest test applies. 
The Commission ordered Mrs. Smith to post, against her will, a 
notice in her rental units announcing that it is illegal for a 
landlord to discriminate against unmarried cohabiting couples and 
that she was found guilty of discrimination. (C.T. 14.)
Requiring Mrs. Smith to affirmatively post notices on her property 
proclaiming statements which directly contradict her religious 
beliefs and forcing her to sign them to verify her public 
submission to these statements implicates her First Amendment 
right to freedom of speech. Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous.
Comm'n. 30 Cal. App. 4th 1008, 1020 (1994), review granted Sept.
8, 1994 (S040653). Because Mrs. Smith's right to freedom to 
exercise religion and freedom of speech have both been violated, 
the holding in Smith dictates application of the compelling state 
interest test.
Thus, regardless of whether this Court chooses to follow 
RFRA, the California Constitution, or Smith, all three sources of 
law require application of the compelling interest test in 
determining whether to exempt Mrs. Smith from renting to unmarried 
cohabiting couples.
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III. APPLICATION OF THE COMPELLING INTEREST TEST NECESSITATES THAT
THIS COURT UPHOLD MRS. SMITH’S RIGHT TO FREE EXERCISE OF
RELIGION AND EXEMPT HER FROM COMPLYING WITH THE FAIR
EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING ACT.
The appellate court was proper in issuing the writ of mandate 
compelling the Commission to set aside its decision against Mrs. 
Smith because the decision infringes upon her constitutional right 
of freedom to exercise her religious beliefs. Exempting Mrs.
Smith from Government Code section 12955 with respect to unmarried 
cohabiting couples would preserve these rights. The United States 
Supreme Court and this Court have granted religious exemptions 
using the analysis of the compelling interest test. This test 
requires an individual challenging a government regulation or 
policy to show that her objections are motivated by sincere 
religious beliefs and that the statute or policy substantially 
burdens the exercise of these religious beliefs. Sherbert v. 
Verner. 374 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1963); People v. Woodv. 61 Cal. 2d 
716, 718 (1964). In order to counter the burden, the government 
must demonstrate a compelling interest that would justify 
infringement upon individual rights and that the means employed by 
the government is the least restrictive in effectuating such 
interest. United States v. Lee. 455 U.S. 252, 257-59 (1982);
Molko V. Holy Spirit Ass'n. 46 Cal. 3d 1092, 113-14 (1988).
A. Mrs. Smith must be granted an exemption from the Fair
Employment and Housing Act because her refusal to rent
to unmarried couples is rooted in sincerely held
religious beliefs.
An individual claiming exemption under the Free Exercise 
clause must demonstrate that the conduct for which she seeks an 
exemption is rooted in religious belief. Yoder. 406 U.S. at 215-
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16; Sherbert. 374 U.S. at 403. These beliefs need not be
"acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in 
order to merit First Amendment protection." Thomas v. Review Bd.. 
450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981). A court need only inquire whether the 
beliefs held by an individual seeking exemption are sincere. Id. 
at 716.
The record in this case shows that Mrs. Smith's objection to 
renting to unmarried cohabiting couples clearly lies in her 
religious beliefs. Mrs. Smith is a Christian who believes that 
God will condemn her if she permits people to engage in non- 
marital sex in her rental units. (C.T. 4.) The Commission has 
found as a matter of fact, that Mrs. Smith's beliefs are sincerely 
held, and are therefore not at issue. (C.T. 14.)
B. The Commission's order effectuates a substantial
burden upon Mrs. Smith's religious beliefs bv preventing
her from complvina with the precepts of her religion.
The Commission's order burdens Mrs. Smith's free exercise of 
religion by impeding her efforts to live a Christian life. As a 
Christian, Mrs. Smith believes that she will be condemned by God 
for sinning, and thus prevented from meeting her deceased husband 
in the hereafter. (C.T. 4.) Therefore she must live life without 
sin. An aspect of living without sin is to not rent to unmarried 
couples. Mrs. Smith believes it is sinful for her to allow 
unmarried individuals to engage in sexual activity on her 
property. (C.T. 4.) However, the Commission's order prevents her 
from acting in accordance with these beliefs. It forces her to 
choose between the law and her religion by imposing sanctions upon 
her refusal to rent to unmarried couples. In addition, the
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Commission compels her to affirmatively violate her beliefs by 
imposing upon her the duty to disseminate provisions of the FEHA.
1. Enforcement of the Fair Employment and Housing Act
interferes with Mrs. Smith's ability to act in 
accordance with her-religious beliefs.
The Supreme Court has distinguished between religious opinion 
or belief and action taken on account of religious belief.
Cantwell v. Connecticut. 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). There is no 
question that religious beliefs are absolutely outside government 
control. Yoder. 406 U.S. at 219. However, even though states 
often regulate religiously-based conduct in the exercise of their 
power to promote public welfare, conduct is protected under the 
Free Exercise Clause. Id. The Supreme Court has granted 
religious exemption to individuals who have demonstrated that 
their religious beliefs are related to their conduct and way of 
life. Id. at 236. In Yoder. members of the Old Order Amish 
religion were convicted under a Wisconsin statute for refusing to 
send their children to public high school. Id. at 208. They 
believed that the values taught in high school were counter to 
Amish beliefs and instead preferred to educate their children at 
home. Id. at 211. In granting the exemption, the Court 
recognized that the beliefs of the Amish were intimately related 
to their way of life, so that educating their children at home was 
an essential part of their religious beliefs and practices. Id. 
at 219.
Similarly, Mrs. Smith's practice of not renting to unmarried 
couples is an essential part of her religious beliefs. As a 
Christian, she believes that she will be unable to meet her
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deceased husband in the hereafter if she is condemned by God for 
sinning. (C.T. 4.) Mrs. Smith believes that non-marital sex is 
sinful, and that she would be committing a sin if she were to 
facilitate this act by renting her apartments to unmarried 
couples. Id_, Thus, in order to live a life without sin, she must 
refrain from renting to unmarried couples. Her conduct has been 
consistent with her beliefs. When she has received inquiries from 
unmarried couples seeking to rent her apartments in the past, she 
has informed them that she prefers to rent to married couples.
Id. However, the Commission's order compelling Mrs. Smith to make 
her rental units available to unmarried couples frustrates her 
efforts to live free of sin. (C.T. 13.)
2. The Commission unconstitutionally forces Mrs. Smifh
to_choose between complying with the law and adher-ipg
to her religious beliefs.
The FEHA burdens Mrs. Smith's religious practices because it 
requires her to choose between her religion and the law. The 
Supreme Court has held that a regulation "neutral on its face may, 
in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional 
requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the 
free exercise of religion." Yoder 406 U.S. at 220. Therefore, 
the FEHA need not explicitly prohibit free exercise of religion in 
order to constitute a burden to Mrs. Smith.
Furthermore, the Court has held that government imposition of 
a choice between adhering to religious precepts and complying with 
government regulation puts the same kind of burden upon the free 
exercise of religion as would a fine imposed upon an individual’s 
formal worship. Sherbert. 374 U.S. at 404. In Sherber:t, an
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individual was discharged by her employer for refusing to work on 
Saturday, the Sabbath day of her faith. Sherbert. 374 U.S. at 
399. After failing to find employment because she would not 
accept Saturday work, she filed for unemployment compensation.
Id. at 399-400. The state denied her benefits because her refusal 
to work on Saturdays did not constitute "good cause" for not 
accepting available employment. Id. at 400, However, the Court 
found that disqualification for unemployment benefits placed 
pressure on the individual to forgo her religious practice. Id. 
at 403-04. State law forced her to "choose between following the 
precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, 
and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to 
accept work, on the other hand." Sherbert. 374 U.S. at 404. Such 
burden warranted Free Exercise protection even though it was only 
an indirect result of the unemployment compensation law. Id.
Similar to the individual in Sherbert. Mrs. Smith must choose 
between complying with the FEHA or complying with her religious 
beliefs. In order to continue her rental activity, Mrs. Smith 
must comply with the Commission's mandate to make available her 
apartments to unmarried couples. However, if she does so, she 
believes she would be precluded from meeting her husband in the 
hereafter. If she instead decides to follow her convictions and 
refuse rental to unmarried couples, she is subject to sanctions by 
the Commission. If she does not want to be subjected to 
sanctions, she must leave the rental business altogether and forgo 
an income-producing activity. Although the state in this case is 
not withholding a benefit from Mrs. Smith, it creates a greater
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burden by denying her a means of livelihood unless she conforms 
with its policies. Such a choice undoubtedly creates the same 
kind of burden that warranted religious exemption in gh^rb^rf.
Mrs. Smith cannot rent to unmarried couples and still remain 
faithful to her religious beliefs.
3. The Commission's order compels Mrs. Smith to Perform
affirmative acts in violation of her religious
beliefs.
Mrs. Smith should be granted an exemption from the FEHA 
because she is substantially burdened by being forced to perform 
acts in violation of her beliefs. Government policies coercing an 
individual to affirmatively violate her beliefs have been held to 
constitute a greater burden than those that merely deny government 
benefits. Bowen v. Rov. 476 U.S. 693, 706 (1986); Yoder. 406 U.S. 
at 217-18. In Bowen v. Roy. an individual seeking welfare 
benefits sought religious exemption from government use of his 
daughter's social security number, claiming that such use robbed 
his daughter of her spirit. Bowen v. Rov. 476 U.S. at 697. 
Although his claim rested in religious belief, the Court refused 
to grant him an exemption because the government did not require 
him to do anything in violation of his beliefs, but rather, he was 
only objecting to government use of the social security number.
Id. See also Lvna v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n. 
485 U.S. 439 (1987).
The Supreme Court has also consistently struck down 
government regulation that required compliance through affirmative 
acts that are counter to an individual's beliefs. gee Torcaso v. 
Watkins. 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (invalidating a state provision
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requiring a declaration of belief in the existence of God as a 
test for public office); Board, of Educ. v. Barnette. 319 U.S. 624 
(1943) (invalidating enforcement of compulsory flag salute against 
public school children whose religious convictions forbade them 
from doing so) . This further demonstrates that compelling an 
individual to perform acts in violation of his religious beliefs 
infringes upon free exercise rights.
Unlike the individual in Bowen v. Rov. Mrs. Smith does not 
seek religious exemption for the purpose of gaining any government 
benefit. Rather, she seeks to be exempted from enforcement of a 
government statute that compels her to perform acts in violation 
of her religious beliefs and to use her property to further a 
government interest. She must affirmatively make her apartments 
available to unmarried couples and she must display provisions of 
the FEHA at her rental units and provide copies of them to 
prospective tenants. (C.T. 13-14.) These acts violate her 
religious beliefs because they facilitate rental of her property 
by unmarried couples.
Mrs. Smith's First Amendment right to free speech is also 
violated if she is compelled to display provisions of the FEHA on 
her property. The Supreme Court has held that states cannot 
coerce individuals to use their property to promote a government 
interest. Woolev v. Mavnard. 430 U.S. 705 (1977). In yjopjoy, the 
Court invalidated a New Hampshire statute mandating that owners of 
passenger vehicles display the state's license plate slogan. 
Woolev. 430 U.S. at 715. The Court reasoned that the New 
Hampshire statute forced an individual "to be an instrument for
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fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he 
finds unacceptable." Id.
The forced display of provisions of the FEHA at Mrs. Smith's 
rental units is analogous to the situation in Woolev. The FEHA, 
if found to protect unmarried couples, would in substance condone 
non-marital sex, an act which is counter to Mrs. Smith's beliefs. 
If she were to display provisions of the FEHA on her property, she 
would be promoting the interests sought to be protected by the 
FEHA. If this Court were to uphold the Commission's decision, it 
would be sanctioning the state's infringement upon Mrs. Smith's 
free exercise rights as well as her free speech rights.
4. Mrs. Smith's choice to engage in the stream of 
commerce does not preclude protection under the
Free Exercise Clause.
Mrs. Smith does not forfeit protection of her right to free 
exercise of religion by choosing to engage in rental activity. 
Although the Supreme Court has denied religious exemption in a 
commercial context, the denial was not based on the fact that the 
individual was engaged in commercial activity, but rather because 
of a compelling government interest. Tlrri ted States v. Lee. 455 
U.S. 252, 261 (1982). In Lee, an employer refused to withhold and 
to pay social security taxes on behalf of his employees because of 
his religious objection to the social security system. Lee. 455 
U.S. at 254. In denying an exemption to the employer, the Court 
espoused the idea that "[w]hen followers of a particular sect 
enter into commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits 
they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and 
faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which
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are binding on others in that activity." Lee. 455 U.S. at 261.
The Court reasoned that granting an exemption to the employer 
would serve to impose the employer's religious beliefs on his 
employees who still had a duty to pay such taxes. Id.
However, the Court's statement should be read narrowly as 
applicable only to the facts particular to Lee, and not to all 
areas concerning commercial activity. The employer in Lee was 
actually preventing his employees from complying with the tax law, 
while not all assertions of free exercise occurring in a 
commercial context will interfere with the ability of others to 
comply with the law. As further evidence that an individual's 
involvement in commercial activity does not preclude free exercise 
protection, the Court acknowledged that even in a commercial 
context, the state must justify a governmental regulation or 
limitation on religious liberty by showing an overriding 
governmental interest. Lee. 455 U.S. at 257-58.
The case at bar is factually dissimilar to Lee. Mrs. Smith's 
leasing activity can arguably be considered commercial in nature 
because she claims the income as "business income." (C.T. 3.) 
However, unlike the employer in Lee. Mrs. Smith's refusal to rent 
to unmarried couples does not affect those with whom she is in 
privity, such as those she may employ to aid her in leasing her 
property, or to her tenants. Mrs. Smith seeks religious exemption 
solely for herself and does not purport to impose her religious 
beliefs upon her tenants or anyone else. Rather, this case 
concerns Mrs. Smith's conduct with respect to prospective tenants. 
By refusing to rent to unmarried couples, she in no way interferes
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with the prospective tenants' ability to comply with any laws.
This is unlike the situation in Lee, where the employer prevented 
his employees from fulfilling their affiimiative obligation to pay 
taxes.
Unless the Court's statement in Lee is read in a narrow 
context, the Court's continuous granting of religious exemption to 
those denied unemployment benefits by state governments would be 
irreconcilable. In addition to Sherbert. the Supreme Court has 
granted religious exemptions to those denied unemployment benefits 
for refusing to work because of various religious objections. See 
Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec.. 489 U.S. 829 (1989); 
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n. 480 U.S. 136 {1987); Thomas 
V. Review Bd.. 450 U.S. 707 (1981). Certainly those individuals 
in Sherbert. Thomas. and Hobbie were engaged in the stream of 
commerce by participating in the labor force. They chose to earn 
income by hiring out their labor, whereas Mrs. Smith chooses to 
earn income by leasing out her property.
C. The state does not have a compelling interest to prevent
Mrs. Smith from asserting her free exercise rights.
Since the enforcement of the FEHA will burden Mrs. Smith’s 
beliefs, she must be granted an exemption because the state does 
not have an overriding interest to prevent her from freely 
exercising her religious beliefs. When an individual seeking 
exemption has demonstrated that a government policy or statute 
imposes a burden on religion, the government then has to show that 
the exercise of religion by the individual would constitute a 
grave and immediate danger to the state or to a compelling
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interest the state seeks to promote. Board of Educ. v. Barnette. 
319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943) .
The state purports to have an interest in protecting 
unmarried couples in the FEHA by the prohibition against marital 
status discrimination. However, inclusion of unmarried couples 
under marital status is questionable. But even if unmarried 
couples are deemed to be protected under "marital status," 
eliminating discrimination of unmarried couples does not have 
equal priority as eliminating other forms of discrimination. 
California has historically disfavored unmarried couples, so that 
protecting them against discrimination would not be a high 
priority. Furthermore, protecting unmarried couples from housing 
discrimination does not meet with the interests of the "highest 
order" needed to defeat legitimate claims to the free exercise of 
religion. Yoder. 406 U.S. at 215.
1. Protection of unmarried cohabiting coup]es is ngt a
high priority in the Fair Employment and HQUsj-nq
Act because the state has traditionally disfavored
unmarried couples.
As discussed earlier, unmarried couples are not protected 
under the FEHA. However, if this Court finds that "marital 
status" does include unmarried couples under the FEHA, it still 
does not mean that the state has shown a compelling interest. "It 
is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some 
colorable state interest would suffice." ,qherbert, 374 U.S. at 
406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins. 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)). Just 
because unmarried couples may be protected by the FEHA, it does 
not necessarily mean that "marital status" should be afforded the
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same degree of protection as other classes enumerated under the 
statute. This Court should adopt the appellate court’s reasoning 
that although the language of the FEHA does not assign priorities 
to any particular classification, it is reasonable to "postulate 
that the [IJegislature did not intend all such classifications to 
be equal." Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm’n. 30 Cal. App. 
4th 1008, 1025 (1994), review granted Sept. 8, 1994 (S040653) 
(citing Gav Rights Coalition v. Georgetown Univ.. 536 A.2d 1, 73 
(D.C. 1987) (Belson, J., concurring)).
If not all classes have to be treated equally under the FEHA 
marital status discrimination should be given the lowest priority 
with respect to the other classifications. Some of the other 
protected classes such as race, color, and sex involve innate 
characteristics. It appears logical that those classes deserve 
greater protection from discrimination because individuals have no 
control over innate characteristics, while they may have control 
over their marital status or religion. See Swanner v. AnchorarT<=> 
Ecnaal Rights Comm’n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994) (Moore, C.J., 
dissenting). But even among the classes protected under the FEHA, 
only racial discrimination has been subjected to the highest 
scrutiny by the United States Supreme Court. City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Ctr.. Inc.. 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). Marital 
status classification has only been examined under the "rational 
basis test," a lower standard. Smith v. Shalala. 5 F.3d 235, 239 
(7th Cir. 1993), cert, denied. 114 S. Ct. 1309 (1994). This 
further supports the conclusion that marital status should not be 
considered a highly protected class under the FEHA.
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Even within marital status itself, unmarried cohabiting
couples have to be afforded the lowest priority as a protected 
interest. Concededly, the state may have an interest in 
eliminating any form of discrimination. Pacific Union Club v. 
Superior Court. 232 Cal. App. 3d 60, 69 (1991). However, the 
state has not evidenced that it places a premium on protection of 
unmarried couples. On the contrary, California judicial decisions 
have traditionally disfavored unmarried couples. See, e.a.. In 
Cummings. 30 Cal. 3d 870 (1982) (holding no overnight prison 
visits for xinmarried couples) Garcia v. Douglas Aircraft Co^, 133 
Cal. App. 3d 890 (1982) (denying standing for surviving partner of 
unmarried couple to bring wrongful death action). In addition, 
legislative enactments have also disfavored unmarried couples.
For example, California's intestate succession law does not 
provide for inheritance by the surviving member of a cohabiting 
couple, while it provides for a surviving spouse. Cal. Prob. Code 
§ 6401 (West 1994). California's bias against unmarried couples 
in other areas of substantive law demonstrates the fact that there 
is no urgency in protecting them against discrimination in any 
context, much less housing.
In contrast, there seems to be greater urgency in protecting 
others under marital status. This is evidenced by a letter 
written to the Governor of California urging him to sign the bill 
that would add "marital status" as a protected class under the 
FEHA. (C.T. 50.) This letter specifically mentioned the need to 
protect those such as divorcees and widows from housing 
discrimination. Id. There was no mention of unmarried couples.
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Since Mrs. Smith's constitutional rights are implicated here, this 
Court should not abridge her rights in yielding to a questionable 
state interest such as protection of unmarried couples from 
housing discrimination.
2. Prote^ction of unmarried cohabiting couples from
housing discrimination does not ensure the peace and
safety of the state, therefore granting Mrs. Smith an
exemption would not compromise the welfare of the
state.
Even if the protection of unmarried cohabiting couples can be 
considered a state interest, it still does not meet the 
requirements of an interest of the "highest order" justifying 
abridgment of constitutional rights. Yoder 406 U.S. at 215.
Where an individual has demonstrated substantial burden, the 
Supreme Court has denied religious exemption where there was an 
overwhelming government interest in protecting the welfare of the 
nation. United States v. Lee. 455 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1982). In 
the Court wanted to preserve the integrity of the social 
security system which affects the welfare of the entire nation.
Lee, 455 U.S. at 258. The system was designed such that mandatory 
participation was absolutely necessary to the vitality of the 
program, thus granting "myriad" exemptions to those with religious 
objections would make it unmanageable. Lee. 455 U.S. at 259-60.
However, the threat of serious consequences in granting 
religious exemption is nonexistent in this case. Mrs. Smith's 
refusal to rent to unmarried cohabiting couples does not 
constitute a prevailing danger to the state because her decision 
only affects a small number of people. She only operates four 
small units so that at most, she would be renting to four parties
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at one time. Her share in the housing market is insignificant. 
Additionally, the state has not shown that there is a severe 
shortage of affordable housing in the area concerned so that 
despite the small number of units, Mrs. Smith's refusal to rent to 
unmarried couples would severely deprive them access to housing. 
Thus, the peace and welfare of those living in the state are 
hardly affected, in contrast to the situation in Le.e, where the 
welfare of the entire nation was at issue. Mrs. Smith's exercise 
of religious freedom does not constitute a grave and immediate 
danger to the state.
The Supreme Court has also granted religious exemption where 
an individual's exercise of religion had insignificant effect upon 
the state. Thomas v. Review Bd. . 450 U-S. 707 (1981). In *
an individual was denied unemployment benefits when he refused to 
work for his employer after he was transferred to a department 
producing weapons for war. Thomas. 450 U.S. at 709. His 
religious beliefs prevented him from directly contributing to the 
manufacture of weapons. Id. at 711. The state had a policy of 
denying benefits to those refusing to work for "personal" reasons 
because it wanted to prevent widespread unemployment and the 
consequential burden on the unemployment fund. Id. at 718-19.
The Court found this interest was non-compelling since the danger 
of widespread unemployment was unfounded. Id^ at 719. There was 
no indication that the niomber of people who would object to work 
on account of religion was numerous enough to pose a serious 
threat to the unemployment fund. Id.
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Similarly, there is no danger that granting an exemption to 
Mrs. Smith would cause widespread discrimination by opening the 
door to false claims of free exercise infringement. There is no 
indication that individuals would fraudulently seek religious 
exemption from renting to unmarried couples. On the contrary, it 
would be against a landlord's pecuniary interest to refuse to rent 
to unmarried couples. Only those as devout as Mrs. Smith would 
seek such an exemption. Moreover, there is greater acceptability 
of unmarried cohabiting couples today than thirty years ago. 
Markey, Landlord’s "Free" Exercise, at 741-742 (discussing 
statistical information about unmarried cohabiting couples). This 
supports the conclusion that there is potential for only a small 
number of individuals who would seek exemption, thus imposing 
insignificant harm to prospective tenants. Even with Mrs. Smith's 
refusal to rent to Phillips and Randall, they nonetheless were 
able to find another apartment. (C.T. 5.) It is arguable that 
they suffered some inconvenience, but it is insignificant when 
weighed against Mrs. Smith's burden of believing that she would be 
condemned by God if she had rented to them.
Granting Mrs. Smith an exemption from renting to unmarried 
couples preserves her constitutional rights while not posing 
serious threats to individual freedom. Unmarried couples such as 
Phillips and Randall would still have protection of the FEHA 
against discrimination in their individual capacity. Just because 
Mrs. Smith is able to refuse rental to unmarried couples does not 
mean that she can refuse to rent to them as single persons. 
Therefore, granting Mrs. Smith an exemption from complying with
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the FEHA with respect to unmarried couples would not endanger the 
rights of others.
D. Enforcement of the Fair Employment and Housing Act
aaainet Mrs. Smith is not the least restrictive means
for the state to protect unmarried couples from housing 
discrimination.
Even if the state's interest is found to be compelling, the 
means by which it effectuates such interest is not the least 
restrictive upon constitutional rights. When the Court in United 
States V. Lee denied religious exemption, it only did so when 
religious objectors could not be accommodated any further. L^e>
455 U.S. at 260. The Court acknowledged the fact that "Congress 
[had] accommodated, to the extent compatible with a comprehensive 
national program, the practices of those who believe it a 
violation of their faith to participate in the social security 
system. Id. Congress had allowed exemptions for self-employed 
individuals who had a religious objection to contributing to the 
social security program, so long as they waived their claims to 
any benefits. Id. at 256.
However, in this case, the state had not even considered 
those who might object to the FEHA on religious grounds. There 
were no provisions written in to accommodate them. The 
legislature could have devised a plan whereby those objecting to 
renting to unmarried couples file a sworn statement with the 
Department of Fair Employment and Housing, similar in substance to 
the one Congress had created in Lee. Since the limits of what the 
state can do to accommodate religious objectors has not been 
tested, it is unreasonable to enforce the FEHA against Mrs. Smith.
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Granting Mrs. Smith an exemption would have no serious 
consequences to the state.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, Petitioner prays that this Court 
affirm the appellate court's decision and vacate the Commission's 
decision against Mrs. Smith.
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